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CONGRESS'S PARAMOUNT ROLE IN SETTING
THE SCOPE OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION
Michael Wells*
Article III presents a conundrum for scholars seeking a coherent
explanation of the federal courts' role in our system of government.' On
the one hand, the framers set up the judiciary as a separate branch with
jurisdiction over federal law and other matters of federal interest.2 They
granted federal judges life tenure and undiminishable salary in order to3
preserve judicial independence from executive and legislative pressure.
It is evident from these provisions that the framers saw a need for a
strong national judiciary.4 At the same time, article III explicitly leaves
to Congress the decision whether to create any lower federal courts at
all, 5 and authorizes Congress to make "exceptions" and "regulations" of
the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. 6 It appears that Congress
can virtually destroy the independent judiciary envisioned by the other
parts of article III. Barry Friedman's "dialogic" approach is the latest in
a long line of efforts to reconcile these apparently contradictory
directives.
Professor Friedman seems drawn to a "constructivist coherence"
approach to the interpretation of article III. 7 Under constructivist coherence analysis, the test of a rule is not whether it comports with the
text of the Constitution, the intent of the framers, the purposes behind
particular provisions, precedent, or principles of justice and social policy.
Rather, as Richard Fallon explains, each of these kind of arguments is
relevant: "the implicit norms of our constitutional practice call for a
constitutional interpreter to assess and reassess the arguments in the various categories in an effort to understand each of the relevant factors as
* Professor of Law, University of Georgia. The author wishes to thank Thomas Eaton and Paul
Heald for their helpful comments on an earlier draft.
1 See Meltzer, The History and Structureof Article III, 138 U. PA. L. Rnv. 1569, 1622 (1990)
(noting that any interpretation of article III must confront "the inescapable tension between judicial
independence and political accountability").
2 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
3 Id. at § 1.
4 See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 78-82 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
5 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
2.
6 Id. at § 2, cl.
7 See Friedman, A Different Dialogue The Supreme Court, Congress and FederalJurisdiction,
85 Nw. U.L. REV. 1, 29-30 (1990). See generally Fallon, A Constructivist Coherence Theory of ConstitutionalInterpretation,100 HARV. L. RPv. 1189 (1987).
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prescribing the same result." Friedman therefore follows Fallon in examining competing views of control over federal jurisdiction in terms of
their fit with the constitutional text and Supreme Court precedent, as
well as their compatibility with constitutional values. 9
Proceeding within this analytical framework, Professor Friedman
rejects the conventional view that the Constitution assigns to Congress
control over the jurisdiction of federal courts. In his view, the congressional control thesis fails to describe the actual state of the law, and falls
short in normative terms as well, because it rests on the premise of parity
between federal and state courts-a premise too controversial to support
a rule of constitutional dimension. He argues that it is better, from both
the descriptive and normative perspectives, to think of the law in this
area as a dialogue between Congress and the Supreme Court, in which
neither institution has the final word and there are no fixed constitutional
principles. Rather, each time a problem arises, it is resolved on the basis
of an evaluation of all the circumstances, including such concerns as federal-state comity, the federal caseload, and the need for uniformity in a
given context. 10 "[S]hould there be a dispute between branches, politics
will determine which branch prevails.""1
Although the literature on this topic is already extensive, Friedman's article makes valuable contributions. While other treatments of
control of federal jurisdiction tend to focus on just one or two of the
relevant constructivist coherence factors, 12 Friedman makes an effort to
consider them all. He, along with Martin Redish, 13 is one of the few
scholars to attempt to forge a synthesis of the law on congressional control of federal jurisdiction and the cases in which the Supreme Court
restricts the exercise of federal jurisdiction. He provides a fine analysis of
the descriptive and normative weaknesses of both the conventional view
that Congress is in charge and the revisionist position, championed by
Akhil Amar, Robert Clinton, and others, according to which article III
imposes significant limits on Congress's power. Whatever its ultimate
8 Fallon, supra note 7, at 1193.
9 See Friedman, supra note 7, at 10-48; see also Fallon, supra note 7, at 1230-37.

10 Friedman, supra note 7, at 52.
11 Id. at 54-55.
12 See, ag., Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article Il" Separating the Two Tiers of Federal

Jurisdiction, 65 B.U.L. REV. 205 (1985) (text and purpose); Bator, CongressionalPower Over the
Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 27 VILL. L. REv. 1030 (1982) (text and precedent). More recently, Professor Amar has broadened his discussion of the area to embrace the other factors Fallon
identifies. See Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U. PA. L. REv.
1499 (1990); Amar, Reports of My Death are Greatly Exaggerated: A Reply, 138 U. PA. L. REV.
1651 (1990).

13 See Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94
YALE L.J. 71 (1984); Redish, CongressionalPower to Regulate Supreme CourtAppellate Jurisdiction
Under the Exceptions Clause:An Internaland ExternalExamination, 27 VILL. L. REv.900 (1982);
Redish, ConstitutionalLimitations on CongressionalPower to Control FederalJurisdiction: A Reac-

tion to ProfessorSager, 77 Nw. U.L. REV. 143 (1982) [hereinafter ConstitutionalLimitations].
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merits, the notion of a dialogue in lieu of rules of constitutional dimension is a fresh idea in an overworked area.
Even so, I am not persuaded by Friedman's arguments. The principle of congressional primacy withstands Friedman's critique and remains
a more cogent account of the law than the dialogic approach he prefers.
Contrary to Friedman's thesis, the article III congressional authority
provisions do embody a fundamental value that transcends the circumstances of particular problems: state governments should have some protection against the danger that the federal courts will aggrandize their
power at the expense of the states, and that protection is provided by
congressional control of federal jurisdiction. Since the members of Congress are elected by state and local constituencies, they are responsive to
state and local concerns and provide a necessary check on the power of
14
the unelected and tenured federal judiciary.
Congressional primacy is not the only value at work in these cases.
Here, as everywhere, Congress must respect other constitutional provisions-in particular, the due process clause of the fifth amendment.
Congress may not employ jurisdictional statutes to accomplish a deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. It is true, as
Professor Friedman notes, that the Court balks at efforts by Congress to
preclude judicial review of government action that arguably raises this
kind of constitutional concern. But the Court's resistance is not part of a
dialogue. The principle that the Bill of Rights trumps congressional
power is an even more fundamental principle than congressional control
of federal jurisdiction.
Besides congressional primacy and constitutional limits on Congress, the cases evince a third theme. Professor Friedman demonstrates
convincingly that the Supreme Court assumes an aggressive role in making jurisdictional rules, expanding or contracting federal jurisdiction in
accordance with its views of sound policy. But, here again, the Court's
rules do not contradict the principle of congressional control, for the
Court invariably defers to congressional decisions to modify judge-made
rules. For this reason, the Court's nonstatutory jurisdictional doctrine is
more accurately described as a form of federal common law than as part
of a dialogue with Congress in which neither side has the final say. I
submit that these three principles-congressional primacy, due process
limits, and a common-law role for the Supreme Court-provide a better
descriptive and normative account of the law on control of federal jurisdiction than does Friedman's dialogue.
14 The arguments I advance in support of the paramount role of Congress extend only to control
over lower federal court jurisdiction and do not address the distinct set of separation of powers
considerations bearing on whether Congress may restrict the Supreme Court's jurisdiction over con-

stitutional issues. The cases relevant to this problem are few, the literature is vast, and I have nothing to add to it.

HeinOnline -- 85 Nw. U. L. Rev. 467 1990-1991

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
I.

Let us first consider Friedman's claim that the principle of congressional primacy is descriptively inaccurate. He does not challenge the
proposition that the Court routinely defers to congressional decisions to
limit the jurisdiction of article III courts. 15 He focuses most of his attention on the cases in which Congress has enacted a statute authorizing
federal jurisdiction and the Supreme Court has proceeded to devise rules
of federal jurisdiction in the guise of interpreting the statute, but without
paying much attention to congressional intent. According to Friedman,
whether the topic is the "arising under" jurisdiction of federal courts,
diversity jurisdiction, habeas corpus, or injunctions against state proceedings, the Court makes the rules it prefers, alters them when it changes its
mind, and justifies them in terms of jurisdictional policy rather than legislative intent or statutory language. It is as though the statutes were
empty vessels into which the Court may pour whatever content it wants.
Friedman rightly concludes that the Court plays at least as large a role as
Congress in regulating federal jurisdiction.
It does not follow, however, that the process is a dialogue in which
neither branch has the final word. The critical issue for the dialogic thesis is what happens when Congress disagrees with one of the Court's
rules. There is no conversation between the branches, nor any defiance
on the part of the Court. Instead, the Court accepts Congress's dominant role, albeit sometimes reluctantly. Consider the Court's treatment
of the Anti-Injunction Act. As Friedman recounts, the Court departed
from its precedents and read the Anti-Injunction Act strictly in Toucey v.
New York Life Insurance Co. 16 Congress then intervened to codify the
principles the Court had developed before Toucey, 17 and the Court proceeded to renounce Toucey in favor of Congress's rules. As Friedman
notes, the Court generally has not read the exceptions liberally, 18 but the
"statute is not a model of clear draftsmanship,"' 19 and 20so the scope of the
exceptions is itself a matter for judicial construction.
Other examples are not hard to find. The Court bowed before Congress's decision to alter the judge-made rules on deference to state court
fact-finding in habeas corpus 2 1 and such limits on jurisdiction as the
Johnson Act and the Tax Injunction Act. 22 A recent case in which the
15 See, eg., Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 400-01 (1973); Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S.
182 (1943); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850).
16 314 U.S. 118 (1941).
17 See P. Low & J. JEFFRIES, FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE RELA-

TIONS 534 (2d ed. 1989).
18 See Friedman, supra note 7, at 17.
19 C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 280 (4th ed. 1983).
20 See P. Low & J.JEFFRIES, supra note 17, at 534.
21 See Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981).
22 28 U.S.C. §§ 1340, 1341 (1988). The Supreme Court has apparently never heard a challenge
to these provisions. Nothing in its decisions suggests that a constitutional attack on them would

HeinOnline -- 85 Nw. U. L. Rev. 468 1990-1991

85:465 (1991)

Congress's ParamountRole

Court makes explicit its subordinate role is Patsy v. Board of Regents,23
where the Court refused to institute a judge-made requirement that civil
rights claimants exhaust state administrative remedies before proceeding
to federal court. Congress had enacted such a rule for some litigants, and
the Court determined that "[a] judicially imposed exhaustion requirement would be inconsistent with Congress's decision to adopt [the statute] and would usurp policy judgments that Congress has reserved for
itself."24 Except for cases like those discussed in the next paragraph, the
Court has never challenged Congress's paramount authority over jurisdictional doctrine. For these reasons, Friedman's argument that neither
branch has final authority is dubious. It seems more accurate to characterize the Court's role, however important, as subordinate to that of Con25
gress, and its cases as a body of common-law doctrine.
There is a line of cases in which the Supreme Court opposes congressional efforts to restrict federal jurisdiction. Where Congress attempts to permit government officials to deprive someone of liberty or
property, without an adequate opportunity for judicial review in either
federal or state court, the Court generally finds a way to thwart the legislature's will. Suppose the government tried to deprive people of liberty
without giving them a chance to challenge the grounds of their confinement before a judge, and sought to accomplish this end by denying jurisdiction to the courts to hear the prisoners' suits. Would the fact that the
deprivation of the constitutional right to a hearing is accomplished by the
roundabout means of a denial of jurisdiction save the government's plot
from judicial nullification?
The answer is no. The closest real world analogies to my hypothetical are the military induction cases that Friedman discusses. The particulars of these cases need not detain us here, for Professor Friedman and
others have described them well. 26 The relevant statutes seem to place
have a chance of success. Cf. Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100 (1981)
(reasoning by analogy to the Tax Injunction Act that damages actions for unconstitutional taxation
cannot be brought in federal court if a state remedy is available).
23 457 U.S. 496 (1982).
24 Id. at 508.
25 The Court itself often describes its jurisdictional doctrine in similar terms, see, eg., Aldinger
v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 13-16 (1976) ("discretionary" restrictions on federal jurisdiction over pendent state claims),partiallyoverruled, Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658
(1978); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 78-81 (1976) (describing the Court's freewheeling approach to habeas corpus); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500-01 (1975) ("prudential" limits on
standing to sue), as do many commentators. See, eg., Matasar & Bruch, ProceduralCommon Law,
Federal JurisdictionalPolicy, and Abandonment of the Adequate and Independent State Grounds
Doctrine, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1291, 1323-55 (1986); Shapiro, JurisdictionandDiscretion, 60 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 543 (1985); Wood, Fine-TuningJudicial Federalism: A Proposalfor Reform of the AntiInjunction Act, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REv. 289, 308-12.
26 Besides Friedman's discussion, Friedman, supra note 7, at 14-16, see, eg., P. BATOR, D.
MELTZER, P. MISHKIN &

D.

SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE

FEDERAL SYSTEM 404-07 & n.24 (3d ed. 1988).
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severe restrictions on access to the federal courts for a conscript seeking
to challenge an order to report for service. State courts apparently are
unavailable for this purpose because of the ruling in Tarble's Case, a
nineteenth-century decision that forbids state courts from granting
habeas corpus relief in such circumstances. 27 Assuming that Tarble is
still good law, Congress could succeed in barring any relief if its power to
regulate the jurisdiction of federal courts were unfettered.
As Friedman's analysis demonstrates, the Court has not permitted
Congress to evade the fifth amendment due process clause by unduly limiting the federal courts' jurisdiction over military induction cases. While
the decisions are often couched in terms of statutory construction, it is
evident that they are based on constitutional considerations. 2 8 The
teaching of these cases is not that there is a dialogue between Congress
and the Court regarding the scope of congressional power to limit all
judicial review of a deprivation of liberty. Rather, it is that the article III
principle of congressional primacy over federal jurisdiction is not unbounded. The Constitution forbids Congress from exercising that power,
or any of its other powers, in ways that undermine the safeguards
granted by the Bill of Rights. Since Friedman seems to endorse this
reading of the military induction cases, 29 it is all the more puzzling that
he would favor a "dialogic" description of the area over one that emphasizes a dominant constitutional principle forbidding Congress to evade
the due process clause by stating its directives in jurisdictional language.
II.
Some observers assert that the paramount role of Congress is so
firmly established in the cases that the discussion of alternative points of
view is pointless.30 Professor Friedman, however, performs a valuable
service by demonstrating that the Court does indeed take an active role
in this area and rarely frames any issue as a direct conflict between itself
and Congress. There may be just enough ambiguity in the decisions to
permit reasonable differences of opinion over whether the case law supports the three principles I have identified-(l) congressional primacy,
27 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1871).
28 Friedman, supra note 7, at 16; see, e.g., Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 11,
393 U.S. 233 (1968). Recent illustrations of the same theme at work in other contexts include Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988) (straining to construe a statute as providing a right of judicial
review of dismissal from a government job) and United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828
(1987) (due process requires that there be some meaningful judicial review of administrative determinations that will be used in later criminal proceedings). See also Battaglia v. General Motors Corp.,
169 F.2d 254, 257 (2d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 887 (1948) ("[W]hile Congress has the
undoubted power to give, withhold, and restrict the jurisdiction of courts... it must not so exercise
that power as to deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law ... .
29 Friedman, supra note 7, at 16.
30 See, eg., Bator, supranote 12; Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdictionof Federal
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1362, 1363-64 (1953).
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(2) which dominates the Court's common-law role, but (3) which is in
turn trumped by constitutional rights-or, instead, Professor Friedman's
dialogue with case-by-case decisionmaking and no fixed constitutional
rules as to which branch controls which determinations. If his approach
is superior normatively to the three conventional principles I discern in
the cases, then perhaps constructivist coherence requires that we overlook its descriptive flaws, abandon the standard view, and conceive of the
law on control of federal jurisdiction as a dialogue.
Two of the three conventional principles are easy enough to defend
in terms of their value. No one-certainly no one who questions broad
congressional control-would challenge the merit of the general principle that legislative power, whether exercised pursuant to article III, article I, or some other constitutional provision, ought to be constrained by
the Bill of Rights. It is axiomatic that the majority's will may not nullify
such fundamental rights as due process of law, 3 1 even if we sometimes
disagree about the precise content of the due process clause. At the same
time, where fundamental rights are not at stake, our society operates on
the premise that majority rule is the best form of government and Congress should be the predominant federal lawmaker.3 2 Given a choice between viewing the undemocratic Court's incursions in this or any area as
common-law rules subject to nullification by the majoritarian branches,
or as part of a dialogue in which it is an equal partner, the former is far
more consonant with the democratic principles we all value.
I do not regard either majority rule or the trumping power of constitutional rights over the majority's will as mere factors to be taken into
account with all the other circumstances when a question regarding control of federal jurisdiction arises. Both are basic principles of our political life, transcending the details of particular disputes, and both deserve
to dominate the resolution of individual cases. Accordingly, I prefer the
conventional view, which recognizes the normative force of these principles, over Professor Friedman's dialogic approach, which focuses on
case-by-case resolution of issues and seems to accord them no more force
than such factors as the federal caseload or the need for uniformity of
33
federal law.
Friedman never questions the validity or importance of these two
propositions, instead directing his normative attack against the principle
of congressional primacy. He contends that the argument in favor of
broad congressional power is based on the premise that there is parity
between federal and state courts. If state courts do as good a job as federal courts at the task of adjudicating claims based on federal law, then
there is no compelling reason to oppose broad congressional power to
allocate federal cases to state court. Although Friedman does not agree
31 See, eg., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (free speech).
32 See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois & Michigan, 451 U.S. 304, 313-317 (1981).
33 See Friedman, supra note 7, at 52.
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with this proposition, the critical objection he raises against it is not that
of his own misgivings. Rather, he points out that parity between federal
and state courts is controversial, and has been throughout our history.
Thus it would be folly to base a rule of constitutional dimension upon the
34
premise of parity.
Partisans of congressional primacy sometimes do rely upon federalstate parity, 35 and parity is indeed a controversial premise.36 If the case
for congressional control rests on parity, then it may well be vulnerable
to the attack Friedman mounts against it. In my view, however, the real
basis for the paramount role of Congress is virtually the opposite of the
parity premise. At the Constitutional Convention and in the ratification
debates, both sides perceived that there inevitably would be important
institutional differences between state and federal courts. In any given
piece of litigation, state courts would be more likely than their federal
counterparts to favor state interests, while federal courts would tend to
prefer national interests. Accordingly, defining the scope of federal judicial authority was more than a matter of symbolic importance; that determination would influence significantly the balance of power between
the national government and the states in the new nation. Bit by bit, in
one case after another, federal courts would build bodies of law that favored national aims to the detriment of the states' diverse goals. 37 Advo-

cates of maintaining strong state governments resisted constitutional
stature for lower federal courts because they feared national power in
general, and national judicial power in particular. For the same reason,
nationalists like Madison and Hamilton favored federal courts.
In the debate over article III, only the nationalists adverted to the
likelihood of disparity between state and federal courts, invoking it as a
justification for creating powerful federal courts. The supporters of state
courts might have agreed with the disparity premise and forthrightly de34 See id. at 34-38.
35 See, eg., Gunther, CongressionalPowerto CurtailFederalCourtJurisdiction: An Opinionated
Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REv. 895, 918-19 (1984); Redish, ConstitutionalLimitations, supra note 13, at 146-47 (attributing to the framers the view that "Congress and the executive
[may] conclude in a particular instance that there is no need to worry about state court interference
... with federal supremacy.... ."). Professor Redish does not believe there is parity between federal
and state courts. See Redish, JudicialPrity,Litigant Choic and Democratic Theory: A Comment
on FederalJurisdictionand ConstitutionalRights, 36 UCLA L. REv. 329, 332-38 (1988)[hereinafter
JudicialParity].
36 For diverse views, see Bator, The State Courtsand FederalConstitutionalLitigation, 22 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 605 (1981); Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal
Judiciary, 36 UCLA L. REv. 233 (1988); Neubome, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105
(1977); Redish, JudicialParity,supranote 35; Solimine & Walker, State ProtectionofFederalConstitutional Rights, 12 HARV. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 127 (1989); Wells, Is Disparity a Problem?, 22 GA. L.
REv. 283 (1988).
37 Cf. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842) (federal courts need not follow the common law
decisions of the states in which they sit, but may make their own common law rules), overruled, Erie
R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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fended state judicial power on the ground that state courts would be
more sympathetic to state interests in litigation. Instead, they steered

clear of this argument in the debate at the Constitutional Convention
over the creation of lower federal courts, in favor of arguments based on
the expense of federal courts and the lack of a pressing need for them.3 8
But the fight to preserve state court power must have begun from the
implicit premise that federal and state courts would sometimes reach different results in close cases. Otherwise, the issue of whether to create

lower federal courts would have little more than symbolic importance,
and the opposition to federal courts at the Convention, in the ratification
process, and in the debates in Congress over the Judiciary Act of 1789
39
was too stubborn to bear that interpretation.

In this view of article III, the point of the Madisonian Compromise,
by which the creation of lower federal courts was assigned to Congress, 40
was to leave the decision to a body that would be sensitive to local concerns without giving undue weight to the narrow interests of any one
state. The framers understood that Congress would be politically responsive to the states, since members would be elected from the states. 4 ' At
the same time, no one state could dominate a body whose members came
from all over the country. On any given issue, only a widespread prefer-

ence for local control could prevail against nationalist sentiment.
This reading of article III holds that Congress's paramount role in
regulating the jurisdiction of federal courts is not that of a mere housekeeping device to assure that the government does not waste money on
unneeded federal judges,4 2 but is part of the system of checks and bal38 See 4 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 133-39 (P. Kurland & R. Lerner eds. 1987). For example, Edward Rutledge opposed the creation of inferior federal courts on the ground that "it was
making an unnecessary encroachment on the jurisdiction of the States, and creating unnecessary
obstacles to their adoption of the new system." Id. at 134. Roger Sherman opposed them on account
of the "supposed expensiveness of having a new set of Courts, when the existing State Courts would
answer the same purpose." Id. On the other hand, James Madison, a proponent of federal courts,
countered that state court decisions may be tainted by "the biassed directions of a dependent Judge,
or the local prejudices of an undirected jury[.]" Id.
Modem advocates of a prominent role for state courts in constitutional adjudication also are
reluctant to rely forthrightly upon disparity. See Wells, supra note 36, at 318-21 (discussing the
views of advocates of broad state court jurisdiction over constitutional claims).
39 See I THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 124-25 (June 5) (M. Farrand rev. ed. 1966); M. FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTIrUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
79-80 (1913). For a compilation of materials bearing on the relevant sections of article III and the
debates in the first Congress on the Judiciary Act of 1789, see 4 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTIuTION,
supra note 38, at 133-61, 220-52.
40 See Redish & Woods, CongressionalPowerto Controlthe JurisdictionofLower FederalCourts"
A CriticalReview and a New Synthesis, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 45, 52-56 (1975).
41 See THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 291 (J. Madison), No. 46, at 296 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter
ed. 1961); Wechsler, The PoliticalSafeguards ofFederalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543, 546 (1954).
42 For an influential expression of this point of view, see Eisenberg, CongressionalAuthority to
Restrict Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498 (1974).
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ances by which the framers sought to cabin the power of each branch of
the national government. 4 3 Without the political constraint supplied by
congressional control of their jurisdiction, the unelected federal court
judges, serving for life with a salary that could not be diminished, would
be free to aggrandize power to themselves at the expense of the states. It
is entirely consonant with the intent of the framers for Congress not only
to exercise broad control over federal jurisdiction, but also to send cases
to state court because of Congress's perception that state courts are more
sympathetic to state interests and will decide open questions differently
than would the federal courts. 44
The value underlying the congressional primacy thesis, then, is not
parity, which is indeed a myth, but the continuing vitality of the state
governments in the constitutional scheme. The state courts' greater sensitivity to state concerns is the means by which the states' independence
may be preserved. Like majority rule and judicial protection of rights
against majorities, the independence of the states is a principle of constitutional dimension that ought to dominate the resolution of particular
cases, and not be relegated to the status of a factor to be taken into account along with uniformity, comity, caseload concerns, and the like.
It may be objected that this account of article III gives too little
respect to the tenure and salary provisions. The objection is misplaced.
Congress does not flout the constitutional value of judicial independence
by channeling federal cases to state court. In the framers' plan, judicial
independence is an aspect of the separation of powers among the three
branches of the national government. The purpose of the tenure and salary provisions is to check the power of Congress to control the judicial
branch of the national government, not to guarantee the integrity of any
court that may adjudicate federal law. 45 It is far more difficult for Congress to bring pressure to bear on the state courts, which are organized
under, paid by, and responsible to the state governments and not to Congress. However dependent they may be upon state governments, they are
43 For illustrations of this theme in other contexts, see Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 490 U.S.
920 (1989) (Congress may abrogate the states' eleventh amendment immunity when it acts under the
commerce clause); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (states hold no

constitutional immunity against congressional encroachments on their authority, since the political
process preserves the states' interests). See also Mishkin, Some FurtherLast Words on Erie-The

Thread, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1682, 1683, 1685 (1974); Tribe, IntergovernmentalImmunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues in ControversiesAbout Federalism, 89
HARV. L. REV. 682, 695 (1976).

44 See Bator, supra note 12, at 1037 (discussing Congress's decisions in the 1930s to shift litigation challenging state taxes and state utility rate orders from federal to state courts, by enacting the
Johnson Act and the Tax Injunction Act); see also Wechsler, FederalJurisdictionand the Revision of
the JudicialCode, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 216, 227-28 (1948) (similar). Cf.Wells, supranote
36, at 324-30 (on the advantages of a dual judicial system where there is systemic disparity between
federal and state courts over unitary judicial systems).
45 See Redish, ConstitutionalLimitations, supra note 13, at 149-53.
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in little danger from Congress. 46

III.
Champions of strong federal judicial protection of individual rights,
like Professor Friedman, may not find congressional primacy an attractive feature of our system, given the indifference manifested by many
state governments and courts to federal constitutional rights held against
the states. The framers, however, would not have considered this sort of
objection to the Madisonian Compromise, for the original Constitution
included very few restraints upon state governments.4 7 Not until after
the Civil War, with the passage of the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments, did the Constitution grant many important rights
against the states.
Yet, even if my interpretation of the Madisonian Compromise is
correct, it takes account only of the 1787 Constitution. Perhaps the issue
should be resolved differently in light of the Bill of Rights, ratified in
1791, and the post-Civil War amendments. Do the sweeping changes in
our constitutional scheme brought about in the 1860s, and by the Court's
expansive readings of the due process clauses in the 1960s, require us to
re-evaluate congressional primacy? The earlier discussion of the military
induction cases notes one well-established due process limit on congressional power: Congress may not employ its authority over federal jurisdiction in a way that deprives a person of life, liberty, or property
without an opportunity for an adequate hearing. Perhaps the extension
of the due process constraint to the states justifies further limits upon
Congress's power. 48 Martin Redish, for example, has suggested that due
process of law may demand not only a hearing, but a hearing before a
judge with the tenure and salary protections of the federal judiciary. He
considers judicial independence a requisite of due process. 49
While Professor Redish's position has much to recommend it, he
46 For a contrary view, see Amar, The Two-Tiered Structureof the JudiciaryAct of 1789, 138 U.
PA. L. REv. 1499, 1512 (1990) ("[T]he framers could not fully trust state judges to police Congress,
for both were likely to be too closely tied to state legislatures and excessively vulnerable to short term
political pressures.") (emphasis in original).
47 See Barron v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (Bill of
Rights does not apply to the states); G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 406 (11th ed. 1985)
(noting that "[t]here were relatively few references to individual rights in the original Constitution").
48 Congress itself is not directly limited by the fourteenth amendment because it applies only to
the states. But the fifth amendment due process clause may be read as limiting Congress's power to
assign constitutional claims to an adjudicator lacking independence. Or perhaps fourteenth amendment due process bars dependent judges in state cases where constitutional rights are at stake. In
that event, the fourteenth amendment would effectively prevent Congress from granting jurisdiction
over such cases to state courts lacking tenure and salary protection.
49 See Redish, JudicialParity, supra note 35, at 335; see also Redish & Marshall, Adjudicatory
Independence and the Values of ProceduralDue Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 475, 496-97 (1986). It
appears that state judges with tenure and salary protection granted by state law would meet this test.
See Redish, ConstitutionalLimitations, supra note 13, at 163 & n.96.
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recognizes that the Supreme Court does not agree with him on this issue.50 I think the Court is correct. 51 If state courts were so hostile to
federal rights that a constitutional claimant could not get a fair hearing
in them, then due process would require access to federal court. 52 But
state courts today generally adjudicate constitutional issues in good
faith.5 3 The forum issue makes a difference only in hard cases where a
conscientious judge could rule either way and remain faithful to the
precedents and other legal materials.5 4 The recent growth of constitutional constraints on state governments may actually count in favor of
state court adjudication. In this way the states can retain at least some of
the authority they have lost to the national government through the enactment and expansive interpretation of the fourteenth amendment, and
our system can retain some of the benefits, such as innovation, multiple
avenues of relief, and differing points of view, that accompany
dispersal
55
of governmental power among a number of institutions.
IV.
Perhaps I am wrong about the Madisonian Compromise, and scholars like Akhil Amar, Robert Clinton, and Lawrence Sager are right in
56
arguing for strict limits on Congress's power over federal jurisdiction.
However the congressional control issue comes out, Professor Friedman's dialogic approach fails to capture what is at stake in the choice
between the two sides. Neither the vitality of the states nor adjudicatory
independence is a value that is properly weighed together with numerous
other circumstances in resolving a given jurisdictional issue. The champions of each position rightly put forth their claims as matters of fundamental law, outranking all nonconstitutional considerations, and one or
the other of them is right.
While I subscribe to congressional primacy, the basic flaw in Friedman's thesis is that he fails to acknowledge that some jurisdictional ques50 Redish, ConstitutionalLimitations,supranote 13, at 161; see, eg., Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S.

90, 105 (1980).
51 See also Gunther, supra note 35, at 915-16.
52 When this condition is met, access to federal court is available today. See Collins, The Right to
Avoid Triak Justifying FederalCourt Intervention into Ongoing State Court Proceedings, 66 N.C.L.
Rv. 49, 54-72, 78-91 (1987).
53 See Monaghan, The BurgerCourt and "Our Federalism," 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 39,
49 (1980); Neuborne, supra note 36, at 1119 & n.55.
54 See Wells, supra note 36, at 323.
55 See Cover, The Uses ofJurisdictionalRedundancy: Interest,Ideology, andInnovation, 22 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 639 (1981); Bator, supra note 36, at 634-35 & n.66; Hart, The Relations Between
State and FederalLaw, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 489-91 (1954).
56 Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article IIM" Separatingthe Two Tiers of FederalJurisdiction,
65 B.U.L. REv. 205 (1985); Clinton, A Mandatory View of FederalCourt Jurisdiction: A Guided
Quest for the Original Understandingof Article III, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 741 (1984); Sager, The
Supreme Court, 1980 Term-Foreword:ConstitutionalLimitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdictionof the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17 (1981).
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tions are too important to be left to the case-by-case method of
adjudication that he apparently favors. The point of a written constitution is that principles of basic governmental structure and individual
rights should remain more or less permanently in place, subject always to
equally fundamental objections raised against them. Considerations such
as uniformity, comity, convenience, and caseload 57 should count for little
or nothing next to principles of federalism and separation of powers. 58
At the very least, judges should strive to identify and articulate such
principles, even if they know the content will be controversial and subject
to re-examination by other judges with different points of view. The dialogic approach at least discourages, if it does not entirely forbid, judges
from engaging in constitutionaldecisionmaking.

57 See Friedman, supra note 7, at 52.
58 See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983).
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